Can a husband and wife agree in writing to end their marital relationship?

Facts: Spouses Leonardo Biton and Fortunata Quijano executed a document entitled "Legal Separation" wherein it was stated that they separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced their rights and obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to which they might be entitled and each promising not to be a witness against the other.

Ruling: "The contract acknowledged by the respondent is indubitably illegal and immoral. Its covenants are contrary to laws, morals, and good customs, and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family. The ratification of a contract of this type, executed by a notary public who is a practicing attorney at the same time, constitutes malpractice, and as a disciplinary measure, this court may impose even disbarment (Biton vs. Momongon, 62 Phil. 7, Per Rec. No. L-2555, September 3, 1935).

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Can a wife legally compel her husband to live with her in consortium?

Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals to have the custody of her husband, Potenciano Ilusorio. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention. Erlinda appealed contending that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together and care for each other.

Ruling: "Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. ” (Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Bildner, G.R. Nos. 139789 &139808, July 19, 2001).

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Can a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex after a sex change operation?

Facts: Rommel filed a petition for change of name and sex before RTC Manila praying that his name  in his birth certificate be changed from "Rommel" to "Mely" and his gender from "male" to "female". He alleged that he is a transexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female.” In 2001, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand.

Ruling: "While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted" (Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007).

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When is venue exclusive?

FACTS: Luyaben filed a complaint for damages against AIMI in RTC-Kalinga where Luyaben resides. AIMI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue by invoking the following stipulation in their agreement: ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.

ISSUE: Did the stipulation in the Agreement effectively limit the venue of the case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City?

HELD: No. Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue, “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place (Auction IN Malinta, Inc. vs. Warren Embes Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007).

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May the surety be held liable when the cardholder renewed the credit card without his consent?

Facts: Ongkeko acted as surety for his employee, Lodovica, in the latter’s application for credit card with BPI. The application was approved and Lodovica was given a P3,000.00 credit limit. In 1991, the credit card was renewed and Lodovica’s credit limit was increased to P10,000.00. As of May 12, 1996, Lodovica’s outstanding balance amounted to P22,476.61. BPI filed an action for sum of money against Lodovica and Ongkeko. In his Answer, Ongkeko admitted his undertaking but claimed that he can only be liable for the original credit limit of P3,000.00 and that the renewal of the credit card without his consent extinguished his undertaking.

Ruling: Article 1730 of the Civil Code provides: “If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.” Under the suretyship contract, Ongkeko solidarily obliged himself to pay BPI all the liabilities incurred under the credit card account, whether under the principal, renewal, or extension card issued, regardless of the changes or novation in the terms and conditions in the issuance and use of the credit card. The terms and conditions of his undertaking are unambiguous and well-defined; thus, there is no room for interpretation – only application. Given that Lodovica reneged on her obligations under the credit card account, Ongkeko is, therefore, liable (Ongkeko vs. BECC, G.R. No. 147275, March 31, 2006).

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May a married woman revert to use of maiden name in passport during subsistence of marriage

Facts: Virgie B. Mora is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. In her passport, the following entries appeared: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. She applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, USA with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname (Virgie B. Mora) in the replacement passport. The DFA denied the request.

 

Ruling: RA 8239, the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, and its implementing rules and regulations do not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. The DFA in fact allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. However, once a married woman opts to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name except in cases of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) declaration of nullity of marriage. Since Virgie’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport (Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. 169202, March 5, 2010).

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Should a credit cardholder be liable for purchases made through his lost card?

Facts: Luis Ermitaño was a BPI credit cardholder while his wife, Manuelita Ermitaño, was an extension cardholder. In 1989, Manuelita’s bag which contained the credit card was snatched. Immediately, she reported the loss and thereafter sent written notice to BPI. BPI, however, billed Luis for purchases made through Manuelita’s lost card totalling P3,197.70 citing the following stipulation in their contract: “...the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases made through the use of the lost/stolen BPI Express Card until after such notice has been given to BPI and the latter has communicated such loss/theft to its member establishments.”

Ruling: The stipulation is not valid. Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly run against public policy (Sps. Ermitaño vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127246, April 21, 1999).

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Should the case be dismissed if the summons was improperly served?

Facts: The sheriff improperly served the summons on defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over his person.

Ruling: The case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. The correct procedure is to order that an alias summons be served to the defendant. The rationale: It was not the fault of the plaintiff but of the sheriff. The sheriff is not the agent of the plaintiff but of the court. It would be a great injustice to the plaintiff to dismiss the complaint and require him to file a new complaint and thus, incur further expenses (Linger & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 125 SCRA 527 [1983])

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Impossible crime

Facts: Jacinto worked as collector for Mega Foam International, Inc. In 1997, she did not remit to her employer the check issued by the latter’s customer and, instead, deposited it to the bank account of her brother-in-law. The check, however, bounced. The RTC and CA held Jacinto guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

ISSUE: What crime was committed?

HELD: Jacinto committed an impossible crime. As may be gleaned from Articles 308 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored.

What Jacinto committed was an impossible crime, defined and penalized under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "Art. 4. Criminal Responsibility. – Criminal responsibility shall be incurred: x x x 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." All the requisites are present in this case: (1) Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property; (2) Jacinto’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for her employer showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched; and (3) The crime of qualified theft was not produced because of the extraneous circumstance that the check was unfunded and was subsequently dishonored.

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