Rule on Police Check Points

"Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. xxx. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search"(Abenes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007).

In the absence of probable cause, the authorities CANNOT:

1. Compel the passengers to get out of the car;

2. Conduct bodily searches; and,

3. Compel the motorist to open the trunk or glove compartment of the car or any package contained therein.

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Republic Act 9048

Act Authorizing the C/MCR or Consul General
to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error
in an Entry and/or Change of First Name
or Nickname in the Civil Register
Without Need of a Judicial
Order

WHAT IS REPUBLIC ACT 9048?

Republic Act (RA) 9048 authorizes the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to correct a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change the first name or nickname in the civil register without need of a judicial order.

RA 9048 amends Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which prohibit the change of name or surname of a person, or any correction or change of entry in a civil register without a judicial order.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the act on 22 March 2001. With the law taking effect on 22 April 2001, the Civil Registrar-General promulgated Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 2001, which was published in the newspaper in August that year.

WHAT CORRECTIONS CAN BE MADE BY RA 9048?

RA 9048 allows these corrections:

correction of clerical or typographical errors in any entry in civil registry documents, except corrections involving the change in sex, age, nationality and status of a person.

(A clerical or typographical error refers to an obvious mistake committed in clerical work, either in writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as a misspelled name or misspelled place of birth and the like, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records.)

change of a person's first name in his/her civil registry document under certain grounds specified under the law through administrative process.

WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS UNDER RA 9048 THAT THE PETITIONER NEEDS TO COMPLY WITH?

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or,

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

WHO MAY FILE THE PETITION?

Whether it is for correction of clerical or typographical error, or for change of first name, the petition may be filed by a person of legal age who must have a direct and personal interest in the correction of the error or in the change of first name in the civil register.

A person is considered of legal age when he is eighteen years old and above. Thus, a minor (less than eighteen years old) cannot by himself file a petition, either for correction of clerical or typographical error or for change of his first name.

Only the following persons are considered to have a direct and personal interest in the correction of clerical error or change of first name:

1. Owner of the record that contains the error to be corrected or first name to be changed



2. Owner's spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, guardian, or any other person duly authorized by law or by the owner of the document sought to be corrected.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THE PETITION?

The petition, whether it is for correction of clerical error or for a change of first name, should be accomplished properly and in the prescribed form. Section 5 of RA 9048 and Rule 8 of Administrative Order No. 1, S. 2001 require that the petition should be in the form of an affidavit, hence, it should be subscribed and sworn to before a person authorized to administer oath.

Basically, the petition must contain the following facts or information:

• Merits of the petition
• Competency of the petitioner
• Erroneous entry to be corrected and proposed correction; first name to be changed and the proposed new first name

WHAT SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ARE REQUIRED FOR CORRECTING A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN A CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENT?

The petition shall not be processed unless the petitioner supports it with the required documents. The supporting documents should be authentic and genuine, otherwise, the petition shall be denied or disapproved pursuant to Rule 5.8 of Administrative Order No. 1, S. 2001. The following supporting documents are admissible as basic requirements:

1. Certified machine copy of the certificate containing the alleged erroneous entry or entries
   
   
2. Not less than 2 public or private documents upon which the correction shall be based. Examples of these documents are the following: baptismal certificate, voter's affidavit, employment record, GSIS/SSS record, medical record, school record, business record, driver's license, insurance, land titles, certificate of land transfer, bank passbook, NBI/police clearance, civil registry records of ascendants, and others.
   
   
3. Notice and Certificate of Posting
   
   
4. Certified machine copy of the Official Receipt of the filing fee
   
   
5. Other documents as may be required by the City/Municipal Civil Registrar (C/MCR)

WHAT ARE THE SUPPORTING PAPERS FOR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME?

As in the case of correction of clerical error, no petition for change of first name shall be accepted unless the petitioner submits the required supporting papers, as follows:

1. All the documents required of the petitioner for the correction of clerical error shall also be required of the petitioner for change of first name.
   
   
2. Clearance from authorities such as clearance from employer, if employed; the National Bureau of Investigation; the Philippine National Police; and other clearances as may be required by the concerned C/MCR.
   
   
3. Proof of Publication. An affidavit of publication from the publisher and copy of the newspaper clippings should be attached.

HOW MUCH IS THE FEE IN FILING A PETITION?

The C/MCR and the District/Circuit Registrar (D/CR) are authorized to collect from every petitioner the following rates of filing fees:

• One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for the correction of clerical error
  
  
• Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) for the change of first name

In the case of a petition filed with the Consul General (CG), the fees are the same for all Philippine Consulates. The fees are the following:

• Fifty U.S. dollars ($50.00) for the correction of clerical or typographical error
  
  
• One hundred fifty U.S. dollars ($150.00) for the change of first name

A migrant petitioner shall pay an additional service fee to the Petition Receiving Civil Registrar (PRCR).

This service fee shall accrue to the local treasury of the PRCR.

• Five hundred pesos (P500.00) for correction of clerical or typographical error
  
  
• One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for change of first name

WHERE SHOULD THE PETITION BE FILED?

The general rule is that petition shall be filed with the Local Civil Registry Office (LCRO) where the record containing the clerical error to be corrected or first name to be changed is kept. Included in this general rule is the case of the Office of the Clerk of Shari'a Court where records of divorces, revocations of divorces, conversions to Islam are kept and where some Muslim marriages are registered.

However, in case the petitioner is a migrant within or outside the Philippines, meaning his present residence or domicile is different from where his civil registry record or records are registered, he may file the petition in the nearest LCRO in his area. His petition will be treated as a migrant petition.

http://www.census.gov.ph/data/civilreg/primerra9048.html

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What is the maximum amount of coins to be considered as legal tender?

CIRCULAR NO. 537

Series of 2006

Pursuant to Section 52 of Republic Act No. 7653 and Monetary Board Resolution No. 862 dated 6 July 2006, the maximum amount of coins to be considered as legal tender is adjusted as follows:

1. One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for denominations of 1-Piso, 5-Piso and 10-Piso coins; and
2. One hundred pesos (P100.00) for denominations of 1-sentimo, 5-sentimo, 10-sentimo, and 25-sentimo coins.

This Circular shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

FOR THE MONETARY BOARD:

AMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR.

Governor

Date Issued: 07.18.2006

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Bar Matter No. 1922: MCLE Compliance

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008.

"Bar Matter No. 1922 - Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. - The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Commitee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts of quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation."

Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)

MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court

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Can a husband and wife agree in writing to end their marital relationship?

Facts: Spouses Leonardo Biton and Fortunata Quijano executed a document entitled "Legal Separation" wherein it was stated that they separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced their rights and obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to which they might be entitled and each promising not to be a witness against the other.

Ruling: "The contract acknowledged by the respondent is indubitably illegal and immoral. Its covenants are contrary to laws, morals, and good customs, and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family. The ratification of a contract of this type, executed by a notary public who is a practicing attorney at the same time, constitutes malpractice, and as a disciplinary measure, this court may impose even disbarment (Biton vs. Momongon, 62 Phil. 7, Per Rec. No. L-2555, September 3, 1935).

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Can a wife legally compel her husband to live with her in consortium?

Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals to have the custody of her husband, Potenciano Ilusorio. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention. Erlinda appealed contending that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together and care for each other.

Ruling: "Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. ” (Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Bildner, G.R. Nos. 139789 &139808, July 19, 2001).

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Can a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex after a sex change operation?

Facts: Rommel filed a petition for change of name and sex before RTC Manila praying that his name  in his birth certificate be changed from "Rommel" to "Mely" and his gender from "male" to "female". He alleged that he is a transexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female.” In 2001, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand.

Ruling: "While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted" (Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007).

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When is venue exclusive?

FACTS: Luyaben filed a complaint for damages against AIMI in RTC-Kalinga where Luyaben resides. AIMI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue by invoking the following stipulation in their agreement: ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.

ISSUE: Did the stipulation in the Agreement effectively limit the venue of the case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City?

HELD: No. Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue, “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place (Auction IN Malinta, Inc. vs. Warren Embes Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007).

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May the surety be held liable when the cardholder renewed the credit card without his consent?

Facts: Ongkeko acted as surety for his employee, Lodovica, in the latter’s application for credit card with BPI. The application was approved and Lodovica was given a P3,000.00 credit limit. In 1991, the credit card was renewed and Lodovica’s credit limit was increased to P10,000.00. As of May 12, 1996, Lodovica’s outstanding balance amounted to P22,476.61. BPI filed an action for sum of money against Lodovica and Ongkeko. In his Answer, Ongkeko admitted his undertaking but claimed that he can only be liable for the original credit limit of P3,000.00 and that the renewal of the credit card without his consent extinguished his undertaking.

Ruling: Article 1730 of the Civil Code provides: “If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.” Under the suretyship contract, Ongkeko solidarily obliged himself to pay BPI all the liabilities incurred under the credit card account, whether under the principal, renewal, or extension card issued, regardless of the changes or novation in the terms and conditions in the issuance and use of the credit card. The terms and conditions of his undertaking are unambiguous and well-defined; thus, there is no room for interpretation – only application. Given that Lodovica reneged on her obligations under the credit card account, Ongkeko is, therefore, liable (Ongkeko vs. BECC, G.R. No. 147275, March 31, 2006).

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May a married woman revert to use of maiden name in passport during subsistence of marriage

Facts: Virgie B. Mora is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. In her passport, the following entries appeared: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. She applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, USA with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname (Virgie B. Mora) in the replacement passport. The DFA denied the request.

 

Ruling: RA 8239, the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, and its implementing rules and regulations do not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. The DFA in fact allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. However, once a married woman opts to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name except in cases of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) declaration of nullity of marriage. Since Virgie’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport (Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. 169202, March 5, 2010).

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Should a credit cardholder be liable for purchases made through his lost card?

Facts: Luis Ermitaño was a BPI credit cardholder while his wife, Manuelita Ermitaño, was an extension cardholder. In 1989, Manuelita’s bag which contained the credit card was snatched. Immediately, she reported the loss and thereafter sent written notice to BPI. BPI, however, billed Luis for purchases made through Manuelita’s lost card totalling P3,197.70 citing the following stipulation in their contract: “...the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases made through the use of the lost/stolen BPI Express Card until after such notice has been given to BPI and the latter has communicated such loss/theft to its member establishments.”

Ruling: The stipulation is not valid. Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly run against public policy (Sps. Ermitaño vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127246, April 21, 1999).

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Should the case be dismissed if the summons was improperly served?

Facts: The sheriff improperly served the summons on defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over his person.

Ruling: The case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. The correct procedure is to order that an alias summons be served to the defendant. The rationale: It was not the fault of the plaintiff but of the sheriff. The sheriff is not the agent of the plaintiff but of the court. It would be a great injustice to the plaintiff to dismiss the complaint and require him to file a new complaint and thus, incur further expenses (Linger & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 125 SCRA 527 [1983])

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Impossible crime

Facts: Jacinto worked as collector for Mega Foam International, Inc. In 1997, she did not remit to her employer the check issued by the latter’s customer and, instead, deposited it to the bank account of her brother-in-law. The check, however, bounced. The RTC and CA held Jacinto guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

ISSUE: What crime was committed?

HELD: Jacinto committed an impossible crime. As may be gleaned from Articles 308 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored.

What Jacinto committed was an impossible crime, defined and penalized under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "Art. 4. Criminal Responsibility. – Criminal responsibility shall be incurred: x x x 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." All the requisites are present in this case: (1) Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property; (2) Jacinto’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for her employer showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched; and (3) The crime of qualified theft was not produced because of the extraneous circumstance that the check was unfunded and was subsequently dishonored.

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Three-Term Limit Not Interrupted by Preventive Suspension

By Anna Katrina M. Martinez

The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Thus held the Supreme Court in a 20-page En Banc decision penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion. Ruling the candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification. “Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit. (GR No. 184836, Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009)

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